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II.
A.

ARGUMENT IN REPLY

The State’s Evidence was Constitutionally Insufficient to Establish all the
Elements of Conspiracy to Traffic in Heroin Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
1.

There was no agreement with Sharon Bernal-Valadez to traffic in
heroin.

The state asserts that it presented “more than sufficient evidence” to prove
an agreement between Mr. Medina and Ms. Bernal-Valadez. In support, it points to
Ms. Bernal-Valadez’s testimony that she hid a plastic bag obtained from Mr.
Medina in her pants, knowing it contained heroin, and that she knew they were
taking the heroin to Pocatello to sell it. Further, it notes that Ms. Bernal-Valadez
testified that Mr. Joyce wired money to her to pay for heroin. State’s Brief, pg. 9-10.
However, none of it is evidence of an agreement between the two as an agreement is
a voluntary arrangement as to a course of action, not an action taken in response to
a threat of violence.1
Strangely, the state asks this Court to ignore the portion of Ms. BernalValadez’s testimony expressly denying the existence of an agreement between
herself and Mr. Medina. It is strange because most of that evidence was elicited by
the prosecuting attorney during her direct examination of Ms. Bernal-Valadez. See,
T pg. 228 - pg. 243. And, as one assumes the state did not knowingly put on false
testimony during the trial, why that testimony was the truth during the trial but a
lie now is not explained by the state.

1

www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agreement
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Instead of making an attempt to explain why only part of the state’s evidence
elicited through Ms. Bernal-Valadez should be believed, the state resorts to
sophistry, inaccurately labeling the argument that there was insufficient evidence
of an agreement as an “I-made-my-co-conspirator-do-it defense to the conspiracy
charge.” State’s Brief, pg. 10. That strained attempt to be clever falls far short of its
intended mark, however, because there is no conspiracy without an agreement.
Lack of an agreement is not an affirmative defense. The existence of an agreement
is an element of the offense, which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
An essential of a conspiracy is that there should be an agreement or
understanding willingly entered into by all the parties to it for the
accomplishment of an unlawful purpose. It necessarily involves a concert of
action, not in the performance of the overt act, but in reaching the agreement
or understanding which is the first necessary element of conspiracy and in
pursuance of which the over acts must be done. . . . Participation in a crime
actuated solely by the compelling fear of personal harm negatives the very
requisites of conspiracy.

United States v. Saglietto, 41 F. Supp. 21, 33 (E.D. Va. 1941). Since the acts which
the state claims form the circumstantial evidence of an agreement were involuntary
on Ms. Bernal-Valadez’s part, there was no agreement between her and Mr.
Medina, and consequently no conspiracy.
The state next argues that “generalized fear of harm is no defense to a
conspiracy charge.” State’s Brief, pg. 10, quoting United States v. Freeman, 208
F.3d 332, 342 (1st Cir. 2000). That may be true, but when the specific fear of
physical harm overcomes the voluntariness of the “agreement” the state has not met
its burden of proof. Sagiletto, supra. In Freeman, the defendant said to the co-
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conspirator that he "shouldn't fuck with [the defendant] . . . [and that] because of
the things that Frankie [Francis] was doing, that he [Freeman] could close the
club.” United States v. Freeman, 208 F.3d 332, 341 (1st Cir. 2000) (alterations in
original). That was deemed to be insufficient to show that his participation in the
conspiracy’s activities were involuntary. Id. In Slater v. United States, 562 F.2d
58, 62 (1st Cir. 1976), the other case cited by the state, the “[a]ppellant induced the
contractor to pay by impliedly threatening to harass the contractor on his present
job and to withhold future contracts.” That kind of mere “economic threat was not
enough to overbear the contractor's will and make his participation in the
conspiracy involuntary.” Id.
Here, the prosecuting attorney elicited far more testimony proving the
absence of an agreement than was present in either Freeman or Slater. Ms. BernalValadez testified about the physical abuse she suffered. T pg. 230, ln. 2-6. She
testified that she didn't want to put the drugs in her pants but complied out of fear.
When the prosecutor asked, “Why did you put the package down your pants?” she
answered: “Well, I put -- I put it because he told me to. And I had to do what he told
me. If not, he would get upset with me, and he would tell me mean things, and then
he would mistreat me.” T pg. 242, ln. 22-25; T pg. 230, ln. 21 – pg. 231, ln. 3. She
also testified that Mr. Medina forced her to drive the vehicle once they arrived in
Idaho. T pg. 231, ln. 4-9. She later said that, “he would make me think what he
wanted when he would hit me. That’s what would happen.” T pg. 235, ln. 25 – pg.
236, ln. 2. She also testified, “He wouldn't like me questioning him. And then,
3

that's when the beating started.” T pg. 252, ln. 22-25. The state’s suggestion its
own trial evidence did not show the absence of a voluntary agreement on the part of
Ms. Bernal-Valadez is incorrect (as well as demonstrating a lack of understanding
of and sensitivity to the dynamics of domestic abuse).
2.

There was no agreement with Logan Joyce to traffic in heroin.

The state also contends that it “presented substantial evidence at trial to
show Medina and Joyce had an agreement to traffic heroin.” State’s Brief, pg. 11.
But again, that claim does not withstand careful scrutiny.
First the state points to heroin purchases between the “spitters” in Salt Lake
City and Mr. Joyce. As Mr. Medina was not among them, that evidence does not
show a conspiratorial agreement.
It next asserts that Mr. Joyce was purchasing as much as 130 grams from
Mr. Medina for $8000 every two weeks. However, “conspiracy requires proof of ‘an
agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.’
Were the rule otherwise, every narcotics sale would constitute a conspiracy.”

United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 819 (9th Cir. 1994), quoting United States v.
Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 347 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 482 (1993)
(internal citation omitted). Proof that a defendant sold drugs to another person
does not prove the existence of a conspiracy. United States v. Loveland, 825 F.3d
555, 557 (9th Cir. 2016).

4

Next, the state writes that:
Although their exchanges were at times straight cash-for-drug deals (Trial
Tr., p.188, L.17 – p.189, L.1.), there were also times when Medina would front
the heroin and Joyce would wire Medina money at a later time (Trial Tr.,
p.154, L.12 – p.156, L.9; p.196, L.24 – p.197, L.5; p.241, Ls.7-23). The jury
could infer from this evidence that Medina and Joyce were in an agreement
to traffic heroin—namely, Medina would supply Joyce with heroin in
exchange for money or “credit,” Joyce would sell the heroin to others, and
Joyce would then use the proceeds to purchase additional heroin or pay off
the “credit” from Medina.
State’s Brief, pg. 11. However, this passage is misleading as the “times when
Medina would front the heroin” is actually one time. The state’s citations to the
trial transcript are to three different witnesses all testifying about the same
singular event. First, Detective Edgley is testifying about some texts between Mr.
Joyce and Mr. Medina. T pg. 154, ln. 12 - pg. 156, ln. 9. Mr. Joyce later testifies
about the same texts. T pg. 196, ln. 24 – pg. 197, ln. 5. Finally, Ms. Bernal-Valadez
testifies about those same texts. T pg. 241, ln. 24-25.2
In fact, there was evidence of only one sale between Mr. Medina and Mr.
Joyce, during the April 2 – April 14 time period alleged in the Information, that
taking place on April 8 or 9, where $8000 was exchanged for 130 grams of heroin,


The state does cite to testimony about negotiations purportedly between Mr.
Medina and Detective Edgley where the detective would pay $7000 upfront and owe
$1000, but that cannot be part of the conspiracy because it is “well-established that
one who acts as a government agent and enters into a purported conspiracy in the
secret role of an informer cannot be a co-conspirator.” United States v. Chase, 372
F.2d 453, 459 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967), citing Sears v. United
States, 343 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 1965).
2
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with a $5000 down payment and $300 paid later. As to the pre-charge sales, Mr.
Joyce explained, “I would give him money, and he would give me however much
heroin.” T pg. 188, ln. 26 – pg. 189, ln. 1. That is evidence that Mr. Medina is
guilty of a delivery of a controlled substance but is not evidence of a conspiracy.
Finally, the state exaggerates the holding in United States v. Loveland, 825
F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 2016), by claiming that evidence of the fronting drugs or supplying
them on consignment is sufficient to show a conspiratorial agreement. State’s Brief,
pg. 12. Loveland and the Ninth Circuit cases upon which it relies actually say that
fronting is some evidence of an agreement but what must be produced is evidence
that the seller has a shared stake in the buyer’s illegal venture. 825 F.3d at 560.
There is no such evidence here.
3.

Alternatively, a new trial is required because this Court cannot
determine whether the jury based its finding of a conspiracy based
upon an agreement with Joyce or Bernal-Valadez.

The state does not address Mr. Medina’s alternative argument that the Court
should reverse the conviction even if it finds that the evidence was sufficient as to
one of the two named co-conspirators, as it is possible the jurors did not
unanimously find that agreement existed. Thus, no reply is required.
B.

The District Court Committed Fundamental Error When It Gave Jury
Instruction No. 17.
Mr. Medina argued that the Conspiracy conviction should be vacated and the

matter remanded for a new trial due to fundamental instructional error.
Specifically, Jury Instruction 17 set forth several “overt acts” which were not done
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by an alleged co-conspirator and/or could not have been taken in furtherance of the
conspiracy. R 273. The state concedes the instruction was erroneous and does not
address the second and third Perry requirements. Instead, it argues the error was
harmless, but it is mistaken.
Specifically, the state argues that there was “overwhelming evidence” of overt
acts five and six.3 State’s Brief, pg. 33. But, as noted above, Bernal’s testimony was
that she did not have an agreement with Mr. Medina to distribute controlled
substances. The jury no doubt believed her. She was a state’s witness and
therefore had the imprimatur of the prosecutor. She was testifying against her
penal interest. Her testimony in this regard was not impeached by the state, nor
was her testimony rebutted in any way at trial. Thus, Ms. Bernal-Valadez’s driving
of the vehicle could not have been an act done by a co-conspirator in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
Nor was Mr. Medina’s mere presence in the vehicle an act in furtherance of
the conspiracy. His travelling to Idaho to conduct a sale devised by Detective
Edgley after Mr. Joyce had been arrested was not done in furtherance of a
conspiracy because he and the detective did not have an agreement to Traffic in
Heroin together. United States v. Chase, supra. Even had the sale had been to Mr.

“5. On or about April 14, 2016, BERNAL drove a vehicle to 4170
Hawthorne in Chubbuck, Idaho and parked.
6. MEDINA, aka “Jeffrey,” was a passenger in the vehicle.”
R 162.
3
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Joyce, he was just a customer of Mr. Medina, not a co-conspirator. United States v.

Loveland, supra
The jury instruction was prejudicial because the jury must have returned a
guilty verdict on an illegal basis. Only four of the nine overt alleged acts were
taken by a named member of the charged conspiracy. But the jury could not have
returned a guilty verdict based upon any of those four acts because two of them (#2:
Joyce providing information to the police, and #8: Mr. Medina’s statements to the
police) were not done in furtherance of the conspiracy. And the evidence as to overt
acts #5 and #6 were also insufficient, as just explained.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Conspiracy conviction should be reversed and a judgment of acquittal
entered. The remaining Trafficking conviction should be reversed. Alternatively,
the conspiracy conviction should be reversed because the court committed
fundamental error by permitting the jury to return a guilty verdict based upon overt
acts which were not committed by any named or unnamed conspirator and/or could
not be done in furtherance of the conspiracy as a matter of law.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of August, 2018.
/s/ Dennis Benjamin
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Appellant
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